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STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN DUAL PTAB
AND DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K Rai &Jay P. Kesant
ABSTRACT
The post-grant review proceedings set up at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's
Patent and Trial Appeal Board by the America Invents Act of 2011 have transformed the
relationship between Article III patent litigation and the administrative state. Not
surprisingly, such dramatic change has itself yielded additional litigation possibilities:
Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, a case addressing divergence between the manner in
which the PTAB and Article III courts construe patent claims, will soon be argued at the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Of the three major new PTAB proceedings, two have proven to be popular as well as
controversial: inter partes review and covered business method review. Yet scholarly
analysis of litigant behavior in these proceedings has been limited thus far to descriptive
data summaries or specific policy perspectives on these types of post-grant challenges,
such as their impact on the well-rehearsed patent troll debate. In this article, we present
what is to our knowledge the first comprehensive empirical and analytical study of how
litigants use these inter partes review and covered business method review proceedings
relative to Article III litigation.
A major normative argument for administrative ex post review is that it should be an
efficient, accessible, and accurate substitute for Article III litigation over patent validity.
We assess the substitution hypothesis, using individual patents as our general unit of
analysis as well as investigating patent-petitioner pairs and similar details in greater
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depth. Our data indicate that the "standard model" of explicit substitution-wherein a
district court defendant subsequently brings an administrative challenge to patent
validity-occurs for the majority (70%) of petitioners who bring inter partes review
challenges. An important implication of this effect is that the PTAB should use a claim
construction standard that mirrors that of the district court, so that substituting
administrative process for judicial process does not lead to substantively different outcomes.
Notably, however, standard substitution is not the only use of the PTAB: particularly
in the area of inter partes reviews, we also see a surprising percentage of cases (about 30%)
where the petitioner is not the target of a prior suit on the same patent. The frequency of
these nonstandard petitioners, as well as their tendency to join the same petitions as an
entity that has been sued, varies by technology. Our data on nonstandard petitioners
provide some insight into the extent to which patent challengers are engaging in
collective action to contest the validity of patents. Depending on the details of how
nonstandard petitioning and collective action are being deployed, this activity could
provide a social benefit or constitute a form of harassment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is the first paper in a multipart project studying the new post-
grant review proceedings set up at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) by the America
Invents Act of 2011 (AIA). 1 These new administrative trial-type
proceedings represent a significant change in the relationship between the
system of patent litigation in Article III courts and the administrative state.
Although PTAB proceedings have proved to be quite popular,
scholarly analysis of litigant behavior has thus far been limited to
descriptive data summaries or specific policy perspectives on post-grant
challenges, such as their impact on the well-rehearsed patent troll debate.2
This Article is the first comprehensive empirical and analytical study of
how litigants use these administrative procedures relative to Article III
litigation. In addition to assessing the behavior of litigants, we analyze the
behavior of both the PTAB and the courts.
Under the AIA, defendants, potential defendants, and third parties
now confront the question of whether and when to challenge the validity
of patents by filing one or more petitions for inter partes review (IPR) or, if
applicable, petitions for covered business method (CBM) review. IPR
petitions are filed against individual patents (and claims thereof), but
multiple petitions against a patent may be filed by the same or different
parties, and a single petition may be filed or joined by multiple parties.
Similarly, CBM petitions are filed against individual patents and claims
that are directed to eligible business method-related inventions.'
Meanwhile, patent owners still face the question of which patents to
assert, when and where to assert them, and against whom to assert them.
The AIA's anti-joinder provision for Article III litigation arguably
increases complexity by substantially reducing owners' ability to sue
multiple defendants in a single case.4 Thus, patent owners wishing to sue
multiple defendants on a given patent generally have to sue them
individually. More importantly for our purposes, the rise of the PTAB
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
2. E.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review:An Early Look at the
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014).
3. In ongoing work, discussed in summary below, we are looking in detail at
patents that are the subject of more than one petition. We are dividing these patents into
two categories: those that are challenged by the same petitioner multiple times, and those
that are challenged by different petitioners. We are further subdividing the two categories
by claims and grounds.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 299. See generally David 0. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 652 (2013) (discussing rationale for anti-joinder provision).
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forces patent owners to factor in the strong possibility of retaliatory or
even preemptive patent validity challenges at the PTAB. As a result, two
complex frameworks of resolving patent disputes now coexist: ordinary
infringement litigation and declaratory judgment actions in Article III
courts, along with administrative invalidation actions in the PTAB.
Multiple proceedings with many potential parties offer a number of
strategic possibilities. Two examples of ongoing litigation involving certain
highly asserted and highly petitioned patents provide an illustration of the
complexities and the correspondingly complicated strategic questions.
Although these cases are hardly representative, they do provide clear
examples of the multiple, perhaps even combinatorial, strategic possibilities.
In a set of seven cases filed between July 1 and July 9, 2013, Zond, a
plasma discharge technology developer, asserted a suite of patents in
Massachusetts district court against nine defendants.s Intel, one of the
defendants, responded by filing IPR petitions on all of the asserted
patents.6 In April 2014, Intel persuaded the Massachusetts district court to
grant a stay of the litigation. Within two months of the court granting a
stay to Intel, all but one of the defendants had filed IPR petitions on the
same claims and the same grounds.' All of the petitioning defendants
received stays, and the PTAB joined them to the Intel petitions. Although
Intel ultimately settled, PTAB review of the challenged patents continues,
albeit with a new lead petitioner.9
In another set of cases, e-Watch sued eleven firms on two digital
signal transmission patents in the Eastern District of Texas.1 0 A third-
5. Zond, Inc. v. Gillette Co., No. 1-13-cv-11567 (D. Mass., July 1, 2013); Zond,
LLC v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11577 (D. Mass., July 2, 2013);
Zond, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 1-13-cv-11570 (D. Mass., July 2, 2013); Zond, Inc. v.
SK Hynix Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11591 (D. Mass., July 3, 2013); Zond, Inc. v. Toshiba
America Elec. Components, Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11581 (D. Mass., July 3, 2013); Zond,
Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Corp., No. 1-13-cv-11625 (D. Mass., July 8, 2013); Zond, Inc. v.
Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1-13-cv-11634 (D. Mass., July 9, 2013).
6. The 27 inter partes review petitions filed by Intel are listed in Table 1 of
Appendix C.
7. Order Granting Motion to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review, Case No. 1-13-
cv-11570, Paper No. 120 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2014).
8. The 90 inter partes review petitions filed by defendants are listed in Table 2 of
Appendix C.
9. Joint motions to terminate proceedings, all filed simultaneously on Sept. 12,
2014, settled the Intel-initiated IPR petitions on Zond's patents. The settlement
agreement between Intel and Zond that governs the termination of all these proceedings
is confidential.
10. e-Watch, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2-13-cv-01064 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013);
e-Watch, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2-13-cv-01062 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); e-
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party firm filed the first PTAB petition related to those patents."
Subsequently, HTC, a defendant, instituted a petition, and the institution
of the HTC petition triggered other petitions.12
A major normative argument for administrative ex post review is that
it should be an efficient, accessible, and accurate substitute for Article III
litigation over patent validity.' In this paper, we assess the substitution
hypothesis, using as our unit of analysis the individual patent. Our data
indicate that the "standard model" of substitution-wherein a district
court defendant subsequently brings an administrative challenge to patent
validity-is indeed occurring. In addition to providing overall data, we
analyze standard substitution by technology area and district court.
Notably, however, standard substitution is not the only use of the
PTAB: particularly in the area of IPRs, we also see a surprising percentage
of cases (about 30 percent) where the petitioner is not the target of a prior
suit on the same patent. The frequency of these nonstandard petitioners,
as well as their tendency to join the same petitions as an entity that has
been sued, varies by technology. Our data on nonstandard petitioners thus
provide some insight into the extent patent challengers are engaging in
collective action to challenge patents.
Depending on the details of how nonstandard petitioning and
collective action are being deployed, this activity could provide a social
benefit or constitute a form of harassment. As we discuss in Part II, many
commentators have noted that challenging an invalid patent, particularly
in expensive Article III litigation, represents a collective action problem.
Watch, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2-13-cv-01061 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); e-Watch, Inc.
v. HTC Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01063 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v.
BlackBerry Ltd., No. 2-13-cv-010 7 8 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Sharp
Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01074 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No.
2-13-cv-01071 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Sony Corp., No. 2-13-cv-
01073 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01075
(E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Huawei Tech. Co., No. 2-13-cv-010 76
(E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Kyocera Commc'ns, Inc., No. 2-13-cv-
01077 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013).
11. Petition for Inter Partes Review by Iron Dome LLC, No. IPR2014-00439
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2014).
12. The twelve inter partes review petitions filed are listed in Table 3 of Appendix C.
13. Others (including one of us) have argued that to the extent the procedures set up
by the AIA resemble formal adjudications, they could serve as a vehicle not simply for
error correction but also for legal and policy development. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Patent
Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE
LJ. 1237 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013). In this Article, however,
we focus on error correction.
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Administrative alternatives may ease the collective action problem, but
they may also provide opportunities for harassing patent owners.14 As
another indicator of potential harassment and delay, we also look at the
frequency of serial petitioning on a given patent.
Of course, substitution of any sort (as contrasted with duplication) can
occur only if administrative review is accurate and efficient, and courts
generally stay any related Article III litigation pending administrative
review. In the case of declaratory judgment (DJ) litigation, the AIA both
bars a DJ litigant from bringing a subsequent administrative review and
provides for automatic stays of any subsequent DJ actions."s So the issue of
duplication primarily arises in the context of infringement litigation
brought by the patent owner. Although a full answer to the duplication
issue awaits further decision making in cases currently before the PTAB
and the courts, we provide some initial data on the question.
In this Article, Part II discusses the normative arguments for and
against administrative ex post validity review as a substitute for judicial
review. It reviews these arguments as they developed in earlier incarnations
of administrative review and as they developed in the far more robust AIA
proceedings. Part III provides the large-scale empirical data we have
gathered. It discusses various indicia of a general substitution effect in the
context of particular technologies and in particular district courts. We also
discuss the phenomenon of nonstandard petitioners and the collective
action in which they sometimes engage. Additionally, Part III presents
data regarding multiple IPR petitions filed against the same patent. Based
on these data, Part III examines agency and court decision-making in the
face of strategic behavior by the parties before them. Part IV discusses our
major findings, suggests directions for further research, and outlines our
ongoing agenda to advance these research goals.
I. EX POST REVIEW OF PATENT VALIDITY
This Part discusses the normative arguments that have motivated
administrative review of patent validity, particularly as a substitute for
litigation in the federal courts. Against the backdrop of this normative
14. E.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881 (2015); Jay P.
Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 145,
165 (2002) (discussing the dangers of delay and harassment in post-issuance patent office
proceedings); Raymond A. Mercado, Ensuring the Integrity ofAdministrative Challenges to
Patents: Lessonsfrom Reexamination, 14 COLUM. Scl. &TECH. L. REv. 558 (2013).
15. Perhaps not surprisingly, since patents became available for PTAB review, DJ
actions have fallen both in absolute terms and as a percentage of case filings.
50
STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
framing, we then evaluate ex parte and inter partes reexamination (the
latter now defunct) as well as the new ex post review procedures
introduced by the AIA.
A. MOTIVATIONS FOR (AND CONCERNS REGARDING)
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
The initial patent examination process will inevitably produce some
improper patent grants. To the extent improperly granted patents impose
unnecessary costs and call into question the credibility of the patent
system,' 6 these improper grants ought to be corrected.17 The importance of
error correction remains a dominant theme in ex post patent review,
especially in evaluating the success of the AIA.' Perhaps even more
important, however, is the recurring theme of institutional design: the
USPTO's examination errors should not merely be corrected, but should
be corrected outside the federal courts.
Several interrelated arguments counsel in favor of administrative
review. Most obviously, Article III litigation is quite costly. The biennial
economic survey of the American Intellectual Property Law Association
indicates that even for the lowest-stakes category of patent lawsuits (in
which less than $1 million was at risk), median litigation costs have risen
from $650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in 2013.1' And for the highest-stakes
16. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7-36
(1997) (considering USPTO's role in patent revocation via administrative
reexamination). For purposes of this article, we need not engage the robust academic
debate over the level of error the initial examination process should tolerate.
17. Ex post review as a means for correcting USPTO examination errors has been a
consistent theme in institutional discussions of patent quality. See, e.g., In re Swanson,
540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Congress intended reexaminations to provide an
important 'quality check' on patents that would allow the government to remove defective
and erroneously granted patents."); In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396-97
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The reexamination statute's purpose is to correct errors made by the
government ... and if need be to remove patents that never should have been granted.");
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The legislative history
of the reexamination statute makes clear that its purpose is to cure defects in
administrative agency action with regard to particular patents and to remedy perceived
shortcomings in the system by which patents are issued.").
18. The degree to which the AIA ex post administrative review procedures are
actually capturing and correcting ex ante examination errors is the focus of related large-
scale empirical research relying on much of the same data as the present project. See
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, David L. Schwartz & Alan C. Marco, What Ex Post Review Has
RevealedAbout Patents (forthcoming).
19. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34
(2013) [hereinafter AIPLA SURVEY 2013].
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lawsuits (in which more than $25 million was at risk), median litigation
costs rose over the same time period from $4.5 million to $5.5 million.2 0
The high cost of litigation would be less problematic if these great
expenditures yielded great accuracy in judicial outcomes. As standard
economic accounts of procedure note, the goal of procedure is the
minimization of litigation costs and error costs. 2 ' But decisions reached in
Article III litigation may not be particularly accurate.22 Because patent law
often uses science-based proxies such as "ordinary skill in the art" to tackle
relevant legal and policy goals, the subject matter of patent law can be
highly complex as a scientific matter. 23 And even if a case is not highly
complex as a scientific matter, the manner in which factual findings
interact with law and policy can be complex.24 With the possible exception
of Federal Circuit judges, judges in the federal courts tend to be generalists
who may not be equipped to tackle complex questions at the intersection
20. Id.
21. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of
Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (modeling the relationship between the design of
legal rules and the likelihood of reaching accurate outcomes); Louis Kaplow & Steve
Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment ofDamages, 39 J.L. & EcON. 191 (1996) (modeling the
relationship between the design of legal rules and the likelihood of imposing accurate
monetary sanctions).
22. E.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223 (2008) (finding high
reversal rate for district court claim construction). See generally Anup Malani & Jonathan
S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 659 (2013) (offering a
brief survey of scholarly proposals to improve judicial accuracy in patent adjudication).
23. For example, a patent may be challenged as being invalid because the invention
that it claims was obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in light of the prior technical
knowledge available to those in the field at the time of invention. Whether a claimed
invention is obvious is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. But the legal
determination is based on predicate findings of fact regarding the prior art and the level
of skill in the art. These findings are supposed to be reviewed deferentially on appeal. See,
e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concerning review from PTO
patent denial); see also Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (explaining factual
findings made by district court are subject to clearly erroneous review). Meanwhile, the
USPTO's factual findings in granting a patent are presumed correct and must be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence in the courts. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Pship, 131 S.
Ct. 2238 (2011). See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068-75
(2003) (discussing the technical complexity often involved in applying patent law's fact-
based standards).
24. For example, the practical probative value of factual findings toward obviousness
analysis may vary by the inherent unpredictability of the given technology. whereas
mechanical inventions operate in relatively predictable and well-understood ways, small
technical changes may lead to dramatic and unexpected results in biochemistry. Pfizer,
Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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of law, science, and policy.25 Moreover, district courts have to contend
with juries, which may be even less equipped than federal judges to
address complex questions of law and science.26 In contrast, administrative
patent judges have long been required to be "persons of competent legal
knowledge and scientific ability." 2 7
Empirical research bears out concerns about the capacity of judges to
resolve patent disputes. The generalist background of most district judges
has led many plaintiffs to seek out specific districts,2 8 with the natural
result being a certain amount of de facto specialization. 29 A few districts
see a disproportionate number of patent cases, and some have reputations
as "rocket dockets" for resolving them quickly.30 Empirical evidence
suggests that, among the subset of judges who preside over patent cases
regularly, increased experience may produce more efficient and accurate
case outcomes."1 Yet this private ordering toward certain districts only
underscores the overall lack of expertise among district court judges.32
Moreover, some commentators have argued that aggressive attempts to
25. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4-6 (2010).
26. See Mark Lemley, Whl 7y Do Juries Decide If Patent Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV.
1673, 1705 (2013) (noting that as far back as the 1950s, modem technology was already
"judged too complex for a jury to understand, so it made no sense to give them the patent
questions" where avoidable).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (requiring that "administrative patent judges shall be persons of
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability").
28. Commentators have long discussed forum shopping at both the appellate and
district court level. E.g., Scott Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John H. Turner, The
Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit,
52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (forum shopping prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889 (2001) (early discussion of forum shopping at
district court level).
29. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 447 (2011) (showing in Table III that the
distribution of how many cases judges hear is highly skewed such that most judges hear
fewer than ten patent cases each whereas roughly the top fifth of high-volume judges
hear over three-fifths of all patent cases).
30. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study
of Infringement Litigation 1985-2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58
(2011).
31. Kesan & Ball, supra note 29, at 423-43.
32. This argument is particularly compelling when offered by judges themselves. See,
e.g., Judge James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: A View from the Trial
Bench, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &POL'Y 425, 430-31 (2002); Judge James F. Holderman
& Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. &POL'Y 1, 5-6 (2007); The Hon. Ed Kinkeade, Point-Counterpoint: TwoJudges'
Perspectives on Trial byJury, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 497, 498 (2006).
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specialize in patent disputes by judges whose districts are found outside
traditional technology centers lead to overly plaintiff-friendly procedures
rather than accurate adjudication.3
Another reason to favor low-cost administrative review, rather than
high-cost Article III review, is that patent plaintiffs and defendants have
asymmetric incentives. Supreme Court case law builds into the patent
doctrine asymmetric incentives to litigate. Under the law's estoppel
provisions, a challenger who successfully invalidates a patent provides a
public good-the challenger benefits not only itself but also all other
potential challengers.34 By contrast, the challenger who loses is uniquely
estopped from challenging the patent again.3 s
Although the public-good-type incentive may exist in the
administrative context as well 6 (and, indeed, exists in both pre-AIA and
post-AIA inter partes proceedings as a consequence of the congressional
decision to implement relatively strong statutory estoppel provisions), the
significantly lower cost of the administrative proceeding presumably
reduces its scale. In other words, although a challenger may still be
reluctant to provide a public good, a public good that costs a few hundred
thousand dollars is quite different from one that costs several million
dollars. Moreover, the absence of a standing requirement in IPR
33. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 631 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010);
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [http://perma.cc/528U-TJS8].
34. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of M. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971) (stating a patent invalidity finding creates nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel,
so that a patent that is invalid as against one party is invalid as against the world); see also
Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004) (noting that, in addition to public
good problem, disincentives to challenge may be created in certain situations involving
oligopolistic competition between licensee that pay sales-based royalties to the patentee).
35. Interestingly, some practitioners have suggested that the pre-AJA tendency of
so-called patent trolls to sue multiple defendants in one suit might have facilitated some
collective action through informal or formal joint defense agreements. See Daniel Bream
& Lee Cheng, Benefits of a CoordinatedJoint Defense in Patent Cases, LAW360 (Nov. 27,
2012). Whether or not that was the case, the AIA's anti-joinder provision may limit this
potential nudge towards collective action. Id.
36. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001). But see Stuart M. Benjamin
& Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn From
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 323-27 (2007) (noting that administrative review
that relied on Chevron deference by the courts rather than estoppel against the patent
challenger could substantially reduce collective action problems).
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proceedings creates possibilities for additional entities, including entities
that represent groups of potential defendants in a given industry, to
challenge patents.
For these reasons, a less costly, more expert, and more widely
accessible institution has long been thought desirable. On the other hand,
even advocates of an administrative mechanism have noted the potential
for harassment of patent owners that might arise in such administrative
review." Harassment potential exists as the obvious flip side of access
created by low cost and the absence of an Article III standing
requirement." Moreover, to the extent that courts do not believe that
administrative review will in fact be accurate and efficient, and thus do not
stay any related Article III litigation, such review may create costly
duplication rather than efficiency.
B. OPPOSITION MECHANISMS PRIOR TO THE AIA
In 1980 Congress created a mechanism for USPTO ex parte
reexamination of patent validity,39 and in 1999 Congress created a
mechanism for inter partes reexamination." These procedures have
realized their error-correction and efficiency goals to varying degrees and
have interacted in important ways with federal court litigation.
1. Ex Parte Reexamination
As the Federal Circuit recognized in a contemporaneous opinion, the
exparte reexamination system was an effort to reap
three principal benefits. First, the new procedure could settle
validity disputes more quickly and less expensively than the often
protracted litigation involved in such cases. Second, the
procedure would allow courts to refer patent validity questions to
the expertise of the Patent Office. Third, reexamination would
37. E.g., Kesan, supra note 14 (noting the potential for delay and harassment in
patent office proceedings); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 522
(2011) (recognizing that "inter partes review could potentially be abused by parties
interested only in delaying and harassing competitors"); Joe Matal, A Guide to the
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of H, 21 FED. CIR. Bj. 539, 550
(2012) (noting that the AIA's own statutory text directs the USPTO to penalize abuses
of administrative validity challenge proceedings "such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost of the proceeding").
38. That said, the challenger who loses at the administrative level may have to meet
Article III standing requirements in order to appeal. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis.
Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
39. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
40. American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
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reinforce investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights by
affordinf the USPTO a broader opportunity to review doubtful
patents.
The parameters of this reexamination procedure reflect its twin goals: to
correct those USPTO examination errors that improperly allowed patents
to issue, and to do so more cheaply, accurately, and accessibly than the
federal courts could.
Cost-wise, the USPTO's ex parte reexamination fee has grown from
$1,500 in the early 1980s42 to $12,000 at present,43 and attorney costs have
risen to approximately $20,000 at the mean and $15,000 at the median."
Even today, the expense of ex parte reexamination tends to be below
$35,000-some twentyfold less costly than the lowest-stakes category of
litigation.45 Moreover, when the USPTO decides to deny a request for ex
parte reexamination, the agency refunds most of the fee to the requester,
further lowering the financial hurdle, and risk, to a patent validity
challenge.4 Consistent with its mandate to correct examination errors, ex
parte reexamination requires a "substantial new question of patentability"
as to one or more of the challenged patent claims, and this standard may
be met by reargument of information that was previously before the patent
examiner.47 Access to reexamination is also unconstrained by traditional
Article III standing requirements. Anyone at any time may seek
reexamination of a patent, including the patent owner and the USPTO
itsef 4 8 and courts narrowly construe agreements not to challenge patent
validity, in favor of access to reexamination.4 9
However, for all its intended benefits, the reexamination procedure
introduced in 1980 has long been criticized for its ex parte nature, which
41. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
42. Revision of Patent Fees, 50 Fed. Reg. 31818-01 (Aug. 6, 1985), codified in
various parts of 37 C.F.R. Part 1.
43. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1).
44. See AIPLA SURVEY 2013, supra note 19, at 1-112 (tabulating attorney costs
reported for exparte reexamination); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1-136 (2011); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1-114 (2009); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1-76 (2007).
45. Janis, supra note 16.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(c); 37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303(a).
49. See, e.g., Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Mine Serv. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
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excludes any third-party participation beyond filing the initial request.so
According to the PTO's statistics," 29 percent of the ex parte
reexaminations filed between July 1981 and September 2014 were filed by
the patent owner itself, presumably as a potential mechanism for
strengthening the patent.52
2. Inter Partes Reexamination
To improve public participation in the administrative review of patent
validity, in 1999 Congress created a new procedure: inter partes
reexamination.s Designed to coexist with the old exparte procedure, inter
partes reexamination conferred significant rights upon third-party
requestors to participate in the USPTO's review of patent validity. A
requestor could comment on every substantive response by the patent
owner to an examiner action and could appeal the examiner's decision to
the USPTO's administrative review board.
However, inter partes reexamination also posed significant barriers.
One was a strong estoppel provision, barring the challenger from raising in
Article III litigation any issues it raised or could have raised during the
inter partes reexamination.54 Even more significant was the prolonged
duration of reexamination. The reexaminations themselves took an
average of 39.5 months, and then had to be appealed to the Board of
50. Janis, supra note 16, at 6 n.12 (citing Shannon M. Casey, The Patent
Reexamination Reform Act of 1994: A New Era of Third Party Participation, 2 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 559 (1995)); Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to Change the Patent
Reexamination Statute to Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 887,
898 (1994); Gregor N. Neff, Patent Reexamination-Valuable, But Flawed:
Recommendations for Change, 68 J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 575 (1986).
51. See USPTO, Ex parte Reexamination Filing Data-September 30, 2014,
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexamination-information
[http://perma.cc/WP77-V8T8].
52. Certain Federal Circuit cases have indicated that patents that survive
reexamination should be viewed even more deferentially by the courts than ordinary
patents. E.g., Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(explaining that reexamination ought to "facilitate trial of [the reexamined] issue by
providing the district court with the expert view of the PTO (when a claim survives the
reexamination proceeding)") (emphasis added).
53. See generally Kenneth L. Cage & Lawrence T. Cullen, An Overview of Inter
Partes Reexamination Procedures, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 931 (2003)
(explaining the structural details and concerns motivating the 1999 inter partes
reexamination procedures).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2000); see, e.g., M. Patricia Thayer et al., Examining
Reexamination: Not Yet an Antidote to Litigation, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 24 (2004)
(noting that estoppel makes "inter partes reexamination something of a double-or-
nothing gamble").
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Patent Appeals and Interferences.ss From its creation in 1999 through
2012, when it was subsumed under the new administrative review system
established by the AIA, inter partes reexamination was never widely used
as a means for challenging the validity of patents.56
C. ADMINISTRATIVE OPPOSITION UNDER THE AIA
The America Invents Act of 201 11 (AIA), which created four new
procedures for reevaluating the validity of patents, significantly
strengthened the U.S. system for administrative review of patent validity.
One procedure, post-grant review, is just beginning its operation as it only
applies to patents that issue from applications filed under the AIA's new
first-inventor-to-file regime.s Another procedure, supplemental
examination, allows patent owners themselves to provide new information
that helps fortify the validity of their patents.5 9 Thus far, the opportunity
for robust public participation in challenging pre-existing patents has
arisen in the two remaining procedures: inter partes review (IPR) and the
transitional program for covered business method (CBM) review.
Before turning to the specifics of these proceedings, we note the AIA's
desire to promote administrative review is probably clearest in the
situation where the petitioner is a prior district court defendant. In the
case of inter partes review, this "standard model" is endorsed, at least
implicitly, by several features we discuss in detail below. One feature is the
requirement that IPR review occur within one year of a prior district court
lawsuit. The congressional decision to include a strong estoppel provision,
and thus potentially set up in the administrative context the Article III
collective action problem for challengers,6 0 may also reflect congressional
embrace of the standard model.
55. This average included some outlier cases, but the median was a lengthy 34.1
months. See Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/statistics/reexamination-information [http://perma.cc/82NT-8L67].
56. From November 29, 1999, through the abolition of inter partes reexamination
effective September 16, 2012, fewer than 2,000 requests were filed, and in most years the
usage of inter partes reexamination represented only a fraction of ex parte reexamination.
See Reexamination Statistics, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/
statistics/reexamination-information [http://perma.cc/82NT-8L67].
57. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
58. As of October 31, 2015, only thirteen post-grant review petitions have been
filed in the USPTO. See USPTO, PATENT REVIEw PROCESSING SYSTEM (Oct. 31,
2015) at 2, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-10-31%20PTAB.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V2N8-EJT9].
59. 35 U.S.C. § 257.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
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In the case of CBM review, Congress embraced the standard model
even more fully. CBM review explicitly requires the petitioner to be
"charged with infringement," language the PTO has interpreted as
requiring the petitioner to prove standing necessary to bring a declaratory
judgment action in district court.6 1
That said, in the case of IPRs, the statutory language certainly does
not preclude petitioners that are outside the standard model. IPR
proceedings have no standing requirement, and the ALA also provides for
potential collective action by allowing joinder to existing petitions.
Thus far, the new AILA proceedings do appear substantially cheaper
than district court litigation. According to the 2015 AIPLA Economic
Survey, the median cost of an IPR through a PTAB hearing was $275,000
and through appeal was $350,000.62 Although the AIPLA survey does not
differentiate between IPRs based on amount of money at risk, these
figures are substantially lower than the median cost of district court
litigation even for the lowest stakes cases.
1. Inter Partes Review
IPR challenges are available to anyone, other than the patent owner,6 4
who has not previously sought to invalidate the patent through a civil
action65 and who has not been sued more than one year earlier for
infringing the patent in question. 6 6 An IPR petition may not be filed
anonymously. the petitioner must disclose all its real parties in interest.67
For any patent that issued under the old first-to-invent regime, an IPR
petitioner may file a challenge immediately."
For a patent that issues under the new first-inventor-to-file regime, an
IPR petitioner may file a challenge only after nine months from the
patent's date of grant or after the termination of any post-grant review that
61. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) ("Charged with infringement means a real and
substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method patent exists
such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in
Federal court.").
62. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW AsS'N, REPORT OF THE EcoNOMIC SuRVEY 38 (2015).
63. See supra Section I.A.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
65. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (3) (providing that a counterclaim challenging the
validity of a patent claim in an infringement action is not a civil action).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
67. This disclosure is necessary because the constraints on who can petition also
apply to all legal privies and real parties in interest of the would-be petitioner. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (b).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c).
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has been instituted as to the patent, whichever is later.6 9 An IPR may
challenge patent claims only on the grounds that they fail to satisfy the
novelty requiremento or the nonobviousness requirement,71 and may only
argue on the basis of prior patents or printed publications.72 To decide that
an IPR petition warrants institution of an IPR proceeding, the USPTO
must find a "reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition."
2. Covered Business Method Review
CBM challenges are available only to parties who have previously been
sued for infringing, or charged with infringing, the patent in question.74
Like IPR petitions, CBM review petitions may not be filed
anonymously-they must disclose real parties in interest.75 Through
rulemaking, the PTO has interpreted the statutory "charged with
infringement" language to mean "a real and substantial controversy
regarding infringement . .. exists such that the petitioner would have
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal Court." 6
Congressional creation of a standing requirement in a CBM review
proceeding contrasts with the absence of such a requirement in an IPR
proceeding. In general, to the extent that IPR and CBM review provisions
differ (and we detail other differences below), these differences may arise
because CBM review was inserted into the AIA relatively late in the day,
and the members of Congress most responsible for the review saw CBM
patents as categorically suspect.77
69. Id.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
74. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125
Stat. 330 (stating the prior infringement suit may be one that targeted the CBM
petitioner itself or its privies or real parties in interest).
75. See id.
76. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a).
77. Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version of the CBM provision as
part of a floor managers' amendment on March 1, 2011, were highly suspicious of all
business method patents. In his March 2011 Senate floor testimony, Senator Schumer
described business method patents as "the bane of the patent world" and castigated the
decision the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank to allow such patents. 157 CONG REC.
S1363 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). Among many Senators on the
Republican side, positions were equally strong. The Senate Republican Policy
Committee's summary of § 18, introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator
Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately):
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For any eligible business method patent" that issued under the old
first-to-invent regime, a CBM petitioner may file a challenge at any time
after the procedure was established on September 16, 2012.79 For an
eligible business method patent that issues under the new first-inventor-
to-file regime, a CBM petitioner may file a challenge only after nine
months from the patent's date of grant or after the termination of any
post-grant review that has been instituted as to the patent, whichever is
later. 0 A CBM petition may challenge patent claims on essentially the
complete range of patentability criteria, including subject-matter
eligibility," novelty,82  nonobviousness," utility,84  single invention,s5
enablement,16 written description, 7 definiteness," and others. 9 To decide
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year Supreme Court
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the patenting
of business methods, emphasizing that these "inventions" are too
abstract to be patentable. In the intervening years, however, PTO was
obliged to issue a large number of business-method patents, many or
possibly all of wbich are no longer valid. The Schumer proceeding
offers a relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation for challenging
these patents, and will reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with
the backwash of invalid business-method patents.
157 CONG. REc. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
78. The AIA defines an eligible "business method" patent as: "a patent that claims a
method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations
used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,
except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions." Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 331. USPTO
regulations further define a "technological invention" based on "whether the claimed
subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is novel and unobvious over
the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution." 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.301(b).
79. CBM challenges became available one year from the enactment of the AIA,
which was signed into law on September 16, 2011. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 329.
80. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125
Stat. 329 (incorporating into CBM review the same standards that apply to post-grant
review proceedings as codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-329).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
82. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing an inventor or discoverer to "obtain a patent")
(emphasis added).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (allowing challenges on any invalidity defense available
under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) and § 282(b)(3), and under 35 U.S.C. § 251). Additional
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that a CBM petition warrants institution of a CBM review, the USPTO
must find that "it is more likely than not that at least [one] of the claims
challenged in the petition is unpatentable," 0 or that "the petition raises a
novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or
patent applications. "91
3. Intersection with the Courts
Both IPR and CBM review proceedings generate estoppel effects,
though not in the same way. The estoppel generated by IPR is quite
strong. An IPR resulting in a final written decision precludes the
petitioner9 2 from asserting any claim in either the USPTO, the federal
courts, or the International Trade Commission (ITC) that the petitioner
raised, or could have raised, in the IPR proceeding.93
By contrast, a CBM review that results in a final written decision
creates full estoppel within the USPTO only-it precludes the petitioner94
from asserting any claim in the USPTO that the petitioner raised, or
could have raised, in the CBM review proceeding.9 s With respect to the
courts, CBM petitioners are not estopped from invoking those invalidity
grounds that they raised at the USPTO.9 6
Both IPR and CBM review proceedings trigger automatic stays of co-
pending declaratory judgment litigation. Just as a would-be petitioner
cannot challenge a patent in an IPR if it has previously challenged that
patent in a civil action,97 if a petitioner files such a civil action after the
IPR petition, then that civil action is automatically stayed.98 The stay may
be lifted only if the patent owner requests it, if the patent owner claims or
counterclaims infringement against the petitioner, or if the petitioner
constraints also apply to novelty- or nonobviousness-based challenges based on pre-AIA
§ 102 or § 103. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 18(a)(1)(C), 125 Stat. 330.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b).
92. The same estoppel effects bind the petitioner's privies and real parties in interest.
93. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
94. The same estoppel effects bind the petitioner's privies and real parties in interest.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1). In general, the provisions of post-grant review, which
apply to patents filed under the first-inventor-to-file system, also apply to CBM review,
unless Section 18 of the AIA otherwise specifies.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) generally estops the relitigation in court of arguments that
were raised or could have been raised in the USPTO, but AIA § 18 provides that
§ 325(e)(2) does not apply to CBM proceedings-meaning that patent validity
challengers are free to raise those arguments again in the courts.
97. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (3) and supra text accompanying note 65.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2).
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dismisses its civil action.99 Likewise, if a petitioner files a civil action
challenging the patent after filing a CBM petition on the same patent,
then that civil action must automatically be stayed.oo As with IPR, an
automatic CBM stay may be lifted only if the patent owner requests it, if
the patent owner claims or counterclaims infringement against the
petitioner, or if the petitioner dismisses its civil action.' 01
Meanwhile, courts still have the discretion to stay existing
infringement litigation brought by a patent owner pending the outcome of
an IPR or CBM review proceeding. For IPRs, where the AIA does not
specify the standard for such stays, prior standards pertaining to ex parte
and inter partes reexamination remain valuable, though not conclusive,
precedent.1 02 Drawing on the reexamination case law, courts continue to
consider the familiar three factors in deciding whether to issue stays: the
potential for prejudice or tactical disadvantage; the timing of the desired
stay relative to that of the administrative proceeding itself, and the
likelihood that resolution of the administrative proceeding may simplify
the pending litigation. 0
Notably, the AIA specifies a four-factor test for CBM-related stays.
This four-factor test encompasses three factors courts previously used in
determining contested motions for stay under the old reexamination
system and adds a fourth factor-"whether a stay, or the denial thereof,
would reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court."104
Moreover, for purposes of "ensur[ing] consistent application of established
precedent," the AIA provides for immediate interlocutory appeal of the
district court's decision regarding stays.'s It also states the Federal
Circuit's standard of review on appeal from a district court decision "may
be de novo."'" Using this standard, the Federal Circuit has held that
99. Id.
100. 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2).
101. Id.
102. See Matthew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review and
Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 FED. CIR. BJ. 469, 469 (2015) ("The courts have
precedent in reviewing motions to stay litigation pending the reexamination procedure;
however, the newly enacted statutory limitations have made this issue ripe for judicial
review.").
103. Id. at 473 (citing Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 943
F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030-33 (C.D. Cal. 2013)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) and
accompanying text.
104. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284.
105. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(2), 125 Stat. 331.
106. Id.
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district courts have limited discretion to deny CBM-related stays when all
claims asserted in litigation are also under CBM review. 107
In general, the AIA's legislative history indicates Congress wanted
both IPRs and CBM reviews to serve as a substitute for Article III
litigation over patent validity. However, for those defendants who are
charged with infringement of a patent that falls within the "covered
business method" designation, the broader number of grounds available
for challenge, less onerous estoppel provisions, and a codified stay
provision likely make CBM review even more attractive than IPR.
II. AGENCY OR COURT: STRATEGIC CHOICES
To describe more fully how these doctrinal frameworks operate in
practice, we offer here the largest-scale empirical study to date of ex post
administrative scrutiny of patent validity. Our analysis is based on a new
dataset of all IPR and CBM petitions filed in the USPTO since the
creation of these procedures under the AIA, as well as data on Article III
patent cases filed contemporaneously with IPR and CBM petitions, and
on requests for litigation stays pending the outcome of administrative
challenges to patent validity. Our findings provide a comprehensive view
of ex post administrative review that assimilates the more localized
findings of prior empirical studies. 0 We use the individual patent as our
unit of analysis and, unless otherwise specified, our time period is from
September 16, 2012 through June 30, 2015.
Our analysis can be replicated using data from the DocketNavigator
service, which provides free and low-cost access to coded metadata about
patent cases in the U.S. federal courts as well as the PTAB.1o' Like
LexMachina"o and other widely used patent litigation data services,
DocketNavigator obtains its underlying litigation data from the federal
judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) service,"'
107. VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1309-10, 1320 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
108. E.g., Love &Ambwani, supra note 2.
109. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://home.docketnavigator.com/ourstory [http//perma-cc/
B4AP-SB4M].
110. LEXMACHINA, https-/Iexmachina.com/what-we-do/how-it-works [http://perma.cc/
WA5J-UEDV].
111. PACER, http://www.pacer.gov [http://perma.cc/YP39-JZ3]; see Judy L. Heier,
Researching Patent Litigation Made Easy, RECORDER (May 13, 2013), http://home
.docketnavigator.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Recorder-Artide.pdf [http://perma
.cc/3ERK-XS3T] (stating that DocketNavigator obtains litigation data from PACER).
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which is the principal data source of many innovation studies.112 Neither
PACER nor the commercial services that rely on it permit researchers to
disclose significant portions of their database. Accordingly, we describe
the DocketNavigator data we used with the understanding that other
researchers can readily access it to replicate our study.'
A. LITIGANT BEHAVIOR
Like the administrative ex post validity challenge mechanisms that
preceded the AA, the IPR and CBM review procedures were established
to provide more affordable, more expert, and more accessible adjudication
than litigation. However, what would-be patent challengers regard as
barriers 114 to contesting validity, are safeguards from the perspective of
patent owners. We are quite interested, therefore, in discovering whether
and under what circumstances IPR and CBM reviews are serving as
defensive tools for defendants previously charged in district court with
infringement; as tools for preemptive attacks upon patent owners; as
mechanisms for harassment and abuse; or as a mix of these functions.
In general, we show that most patents challenged in the PTAB are
also challenged in Article III litigation. However, there is no clear
relationship between the number of times a patent is challenged in the
PTAB and the numbers of times it is asserted in district court.
Additionally, while Chemical patents are disproportionately likely to be
the subject of a PTAB-only challenge, Computers and Communications
(CCM) patents are disproportionately unlikely to be challenged only in the
PTAB.
We also studied behavior at the level of the individual petitioner. For
both CBM reviews and IPRs, the standard substitution model describes
112. E.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the
Realities ofModern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REv. 1769, 1772 (2014) (identifying Lex
Machina, which obtains and cleans original PACER information, as the data source);
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1440-41 (2009) (identifring PACER as the data source); Jay P. Kesan &
Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 266 (2006)
(identifying PACER as the data source).
113. See infra Appendix A.
114. Such barriers include, for example, potential estoppel in the federal courts from
initiating an administrative validity challenge in the USPTO. Supra Section I.C.3. More
generally, as discussed in detail in Part II, patent challengers face a significant collective
action problem. See Thomas, supra note 36, at 333 (noting that third parties to a
successful validity challenge "may readily free ride from the efforts of the former patentee
and the opponent, employing the teachings of the invalidated patent to practice the
invention without compensation to anyone").
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the majority of cases. Notably, however, in the context of IPRs, the
percentage of petitioners who fall outside the standard model because they
have not themselves previously been sued on the patent in question is
surprisingly substantial, on the order of 30 percent. This percentage is
particularly high with respect to Drugs and Medical patents. Also notable
is the extent to which petitioners that have not previously been sued join
the same petitions as those that have been sued. In the case of Drugs and
Medical patents, for example, petitioners that have not previously been
defendants disproportionately appear to be engaged in collective action
with those that are defendants.
1. IPR and CBM Petitions: Descriptive Statistics
a) IPR Petitions
Through the end of June 2015, petitioners have filed 3,157 petitions
for inter partes review. As Figure 1 shows,115 these filings began slowly in
September 2012, when the IPR procedure became available, and have
risen from twenty petitions per month to roughly 140 petitions per month.
These petitions have been distributed unevenly across technology
areas. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) categorizes
patents into six different technology areas: (1) Chemical (excluding
Drugs); (2) Computers and Communications (CCM); (3) Drugs and
Medical; (4) Electrical and Electronics; (5) Mechanical; and (6) Others."
As Figure 2 shows, IPR petitions disaggregated by NBER's six-part
category scheme have predominantly challenged CCM-related patents,
which account for just over half (50.4%) of all IPR petitions. Figure 3
confirms this trend has persisted from the start, with cumulative filings in
CCM-related IPR petitions rising considerably faster than those in all
other technology areas.
Although IPR petitions may challenge patent claims as to either
novelty or nonobviousness, nonobviousness challenges predominate across
all major technology areas. As Figure 4 shows, nearly all IPR petitions
include a nonobviousness challenge, whereas the proportion of IPR
petitions that include a novelty challenge varies considerably by
technology. The preference for including nonobviousness as a basis for
115. Figures are presented in Appendix B
116. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The
NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 13 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), http://www.nber.org/patents
[http://perma.cc/NY76-VHVV] (articulating and defining the NBER classification
system and its concordance with the U.S. Patent Classification system).
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challenge is not surprising. While a novelty-based challenge must rest on a
single reference, a nonobviousness-based challenge can presumably take
advantage of the ability of PTAB judges to engage in complex reasoning
that combines multiple references." 7
b) CBM Petitions
Compared to IPR petitions, usage of the CBM procedure has been
considerably smaller in scale. Through the end of May 2015, petitioners
have filed 362 petitions for CBM review. As Figure 5 shows, these filings
have averaged between ten and fifteen petitions per month. Moreover,
because CBM proceedings are oriented by definition toward business-
method-related technologies such as information and communications, it
is unsurprising that an overwhelming majority (82.2%) of CBM petitions
challenge Computers and Communications-related patents. Mechanical-
related patents make up another 15.9% of CBM petitions, and only a
negligible share of CBM petitions fall in any other category. Figure 6
illustrates these trends.
Unlike IPR petitions, CBM petitions may challenge patent claims on
a fuller range of patentability requirements: in addition to novelty and
nonobviousness, subject-matter eligibility, enablement, written
description, and indefiniteness are available grounds. Across this range of
options, however, petitioners have focused their attention primarily on
subject-matter eligibility and nonobviousness. As Figure 7 shows, 68.6%
of CBM petitions challenged the subject-matter eligibility of the patent in
dispute, and 71.1% challenged the nonobviousness of the patent. Just
under half (48.3%) challenged novelty. By contrast, challenges as to
enablement, written description, and indefiniteness each arose in fewer
than 20% of petitions.
As with IPR petitions, the relative preference for nonobviousness
challenges over novelty challenges in CBM petitions is rational given the
greater availability of combining prior art references in evaluating
nonobviousness. In addition, the strong preference for subject-matter
eligibility challenges is consistent with the widespread view among critics
of business method patents that such patents are not just narrowly
117. John Schroeder, First Ever Inter Partes Review Decision Finds Claims Not
Patentable, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.lexology.con/library/detail.aspx?g
=d699d660-d5da-4953-afOf-a88e3d3152d2 [perma.cc/CW4C-DGK6] (noting "the general
consensus that inter partes review may yield better results [than juries in district court
litigation] when relying on complex invalidity arguments hinging on a combination of
prior art references").
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problematic for inadequate disclosure in the patent specification or lack
clarity in the claims-problems that are more the purview of enablement,
written description, and indefiniteness-but instead are outside the scope
of what should be eligible for patent protection in the first place."'
Beyond these basic PTAB filing trends, we find that a number of
patents have been targets of serial challenges spread across both multiple
petitions and multiple challengers in IPR petitions. Patents in the
Chemical, CCM, and Electrical areas are particularly prone to multiple
petitions. As Figure 8 shows, a majority of patents in each of these fields
were the subject of multiple IPR petitions: 60.6% of Chemical patents,
50.9% of CCM patents, and 58.4% of Electrical patents. Figure 9 shows
how these serial challenges are distributed within technology categories,
notably that the highest volume of serial challenges is in the CCM area.
We are currently studying the precise nature of these serial challenges (for
example, whether they are being brought by the same petitioner) to
determine whether they could represent harassment and therefore are
problematic from a policy perspective. The frequency of serial challenge to
a patent may also be related to the number of defendants against whom
the patent is asserted in court.
We turn next to the general question of the relationship between
patent challenges at the PTAB and patent litigation in the district courts.
118. This view was held by Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version of the
CBM provision as part of a floor managers' amendment on March 1, 2011. In his March
2011 Senate floor testimony, Senator Schumer described business method patents as "the
bane of the patent world" and castigated the decision the Federal Circuit in State Street
Bank to allow such patents. 157 CONG REc. S1363 (March 8, 2011) (statement of
Senator Schumer). Among many Senators on the Republican side, positions were equally
strong. The Senate Republican Policy Committee's summary of § 18, introduced into the
Congressional Record by Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately):
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year Supreme Court
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the patenting
of business methods, emphasizing that these "inventions" are too
abstract to be patentable. In the intervening years, however, PTO was
obliged to issue a large number of business-method patents, many or
possibly all of which are no longer valid. The Schumer proceeding
offers a relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation for challenging
these patents, and will reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with
the backwash of invalid business-method patents.
157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the "nature of the patent" as a newly relevant consideration in enforcement
and accusing business method patents in particular of "potential vagueness and suspect
validity").
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2. Article III Litigation
Contemporaneous with petitions for IPR and CBM review in the
USPTO, patent litigation in the federal courts has continued apace. To
investigate the interaction between these two fora, we collected data on all
24,162 patent cases filed between September 16, 2011, and June 30, 2015,
in the federal district courts.'
Many of these cases involved multiple patents-in-suit, and we
observed a total of 47,764 patent assertions across these cases, 20 or an
average of 1.98 assertions per patent case. Figure 10 shows the trend in
patent cases over this period rising from 150 case filings per month in
September 2011 to an average of over 500 case filings per month by June
2015. These petitions have also been distributed unevenly across
technology areas. Figure 11 shows that patent cases have predominantly
involved CCM-related patents, which far outpace all other technology
areas, and that this trend has persisted from the start, with cumulative
filings in CCM-related patent cases rising considerably faster than in all
other technology areas. 12 1
During this time, a total of 14,218 patents were either challenged in an
IPR or CBM petition, asserted in litigation, or both. A subset of 13,557
patents were involved in litigation alone; 298 patents were involved in a
USPTO proceeding alone; and 1,968 patents were involved in both.
Accordingly, about 12.7% of litigated patents are also being challenged in
the PTAB,'1 22 and about 86.8% of IPR- or CBM-challenged patents are
also being litigated in the federal courts.1 23
119. We chose September 16, 2011 as our starting date for district court litigation
because it represents the first date on which patents asserted in litigation could become
the subject of a PTAB filing. Consistent with our interest in examining the interaction
between assertion by patent owners and PTAB petitions, we excluded declaratory
judgment actions. In any event, as discussed in the text, the AIA essentially makes
declaratory judgment actions unavailable to those who file PTAB petitions. See supra Part I.
120. Though the data that we collected include cases where design and plant patents
were asserted (either exclusively or together with utility patents), we focus our analysis on
utility patents.
121. Because district court cases can (and frequently do) involve multiple-patents in a
single suit-unlike IPR or CBM petitions, which are necessarily limited to a single
patent-we calculate technology trends by aggregating a technology's relative share
among the patents that were asserted in each case. For example, a patent case involving
three CCM patents and two Electrical patents would have been counted as 0.6 of a
CCM case and 0.4 of an Electrical case.
122. This is calculated as 1968/(1968+13557)=12.7%.
123. This is calculated as 1968/(1968+298)=86.8%.
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These measures suggest validity challenges in the USPTO are, indeed,
connected with the threat or fact of infringement litigation, for a large
majority of challenged patents are also asserted in court. Our data indicate
that patents challenged in the PTAB are, on average, also asserted at least
three times in court. As Figure 12 indicates, however, this average reflects
considerable variation (as shown by the error bars representing one
standard deviation of the mean). At least when the group of patents
involved in IPR and CBM proceedings is considered as a whole-that is,
without disaggregation by technology and district court-the relationship
between the number of IPR or CBM petitions that were filed on a patent
and the number of times that the patent was asserted in district court is
not monotonic. Finally, of course, most patents challenged in district court
are not asserted at the PTAB.
To further investigate the relationship between PTAB challenges and
Article III assertions, we evaluated a series of measures constructed from
the underlying data.
a) IPR and CBM Reviews with Litigation in the Offing
In light of the intended uses of IPR and CBM review as substitutes for
federal court litigation, notably, in a number of cases, a given patent was
challenged in a PTAB petition before that patent was asserted in litigation.
This is a relatively rare occurrence. As of June 30, 2015, 1,968 patents
have been the subjects of both a PTAB challenge (either in IPR or CBM)
and of district court litigation. Only fifty-eight of these patents (3.01%)
were challenged in district court litigation simultaneously with or after the
first PTAB challenge, rather than before.
Their small number notwithstanding, these cases arguably represent a
challenge to the standard model of a PTAB challenge as a substitute for
ongoing litigation. However, a relatively small variation to that standard
model could encompass the case where litigation was actually imminent.
In other words, in these circumstances the filing of a petition in the PTAB
was similar to a declaratory judgment action. That is, indeed, what we
find. Of the fifty-eight patents that were challenged in the PTAB before
any litigation, forty-seven patents (81.0%) were challenged by petitioners
who were subsequently named as defendants in federal court litigation
over the same patents.
b) IPR and CBM Reviews with No Related Litigation
Another phenomenon that must be reconciled with the standard
model is that some patents are challenged in the PTAB but have not been
observed in litigation at all, either before or after the petition for IPR or
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CBM review. Though a PTAB validity challenge is a reasonable substitute
for litigation that has already begun or is imminent, it may be a potentially
counterproductive approach for anyone else:1 24 particularly in the case of
an IPR (where, as contrasted with the CBM review, the petitioner does
not have to be charged in any way with infringement), such a challenger
might simply raise unwanted attention to its potentially infringing
activities. Indeed, IPRs or CBM reviews with no related litigation are a
somewhat rare occurrence. As of June 30, 2015, only 298 patents (13.2%)
have been challenged in the PTAB with no related litigation observed in
the federal courts. But even the existence of such a subset might be
considered peculiar.
There are several potential reasons for this unexpected subset. One is
statistical censoring: the PTAB challenges are simply so recent that the
patent owner has not filed responsive litigation yet, but may do so in the
relatively near term. Censoring, however, does not appear to explain the
subset fully. Petitions on such "PTAB-only" patents have been filed from
the earliest days of IPR and CBM review in September 2012. As of June
30, 2015, 332 petitions have been filed on patents with no related
litigation observed and 163 (49.1%) of those petitions were filed more
than one year ago from the present or in or before June 2014. In other
words, many of the patent owners have had ample time to bring
infringement actions against the petitioners who filed for IPR or CBM
review and have not yet done so. So it is still possible, but increasingly
unlikely, that a patent owner who has not asserted a patent against an IPR
or CBM challenger will do so now.
A second possible reason for this phenomenon is statistical selection,
including technology-specific selection: where a PTAB validity challenge
is sufficiently strong, and a patent owner's countervailing infringement
claim against the PTAB challenger is sufficiently weak, an invalidity
challenge might arise without any corresponding infringement assertion.
This kind of selection effect, however, would require that both parties
have information ex ante about the relative merits of each other's case, i.e.,
about the boundaries and legal viability of the patent in dispute, that is
124. For example, the filing fees for IPR are $9,000 at the petition stage and $14,000
at the post-institution stage. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a). The filing fees for-CBM review are
even higher: $12,000 at the petition stage and $18,000 at the post-institution stage. 37
C.F.R. § 42.15(b). Contemporaneous estimates of average attorney costs were over
$130,000. Olga Berson, Challenging Patent Validity Under the AL: Strategic and Tactical
Considerations When Deciding Whether to Pursue Ex parte Reexamination or Inter Partes
Review As Part ofthe Overall Litigation Strategy, 2012 WL 6636452, *12 (2012).
2016] 71
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:1
both adequate and roughly symmetric. Such ex ante clarity may be possible
for Chemical and Drugs and Medical patents, where technical
nomenclature is standardized and the boundaries of the invention are
amenable to delineation. 1 25 Ex ante clarity may even be possible for
Electrical and Mechanical patents if the patent discloses sufficiently
detailed structural information. However, patents on CCM inventions
that are claimed in functional terms would be much less likely to provide
enough ex ante clarity that a PTAB challenge would be so plainly strong,
and a retaliatory infringement suit so plainly weak, as to produce an IPR
or CBM review with no litigation in response.
Additionally, in at least some technology areas, the number of patents
that are clearly "important" as a matter of potential litigation risk may be
relatively small and easy to identify. Particularly in the context of IPRs
(which can be filed even without any assertion of infringement on the part
of the patentee), the high volume of CCM-related patents may make it
unclear which patents are most important.
The data are consistent with technology-specific selection effects
across the three subsets of (1) patents that were only challenged in the
PTAB, (2) patents that were only asserted in litigation, and (3) patents
that were both challenged in the PTAB and asserted in litigation as
summarized in Figure 13. Comparing PTAB-only patents with district
court-only patents, the technology distributions were mostly similar. In
both subsets, CCM patents accounted for about a third (32.8% and
37.1%, respectively); Drugs and Medical patents about a fifth (20.6% and
19.7%, respectively); Electrical patents a little less than a seventh (13.9%
and 11.3%, respectively); and Mechanical patents a little more than a tenth
(11.5% and 10.1%, respectively). 26 Only Chemical patents occupied a
significantly greater share of PTAB-only patents (12.5%) than of district
court-only patents (4.9%).127
The most notable difference was for patents that were both challenged
in the PTAB and asserted in district court. A majority of these PTAB-
and-district-court patents (54.7%) were in the CCM technology area, as
125. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 36 (2013). Indeed, in the case of certain drugs (so-called small
molecule drugs), patents asserted to cover the drug are specifically on the FDA "Orange
Book"
126. These differences were not statistically significant (p >0.05 using a two-tailed
test of proportions).
127. Conversely, "Other" patents occupied a greater share of district court-only
patents (16.9%) than of PTAB-only patents (8.8%).
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compared with 32.8% of PTAB-only patents. 128 This underrepresentation
of CCM patents in the PTAB-only group is consistent with the expected
lower likelihood that CCM patents offer enough ex ante clarity and
evidence of importance to produce PTAB challenges in situations where
there is no federal court litigation.
Having considered the special cases of PTAB validity challenges that
either precede a district court litigation or have no related litigation at all,
we now turn to the standard model of PTAB validity challenge as a direct
response by a defendant in prior infringement litigation.
c) CBM and IPR Challenges As Direct Self Interest
As we have discussed, a defendant that challenges a patent's validity in
the USPTO after the patent has been asserted in litigation is the standard
use of CBM and IPR petitions. The USPTO's expertise substitutes for
the generalist orientation of the courts. We find that, overall, CBM and
IPR petitions are in fact predominantly assertions of the petitioners' own
direct interests with respect to infringement liability on the particular
patent being challenged.
In the majority of cases, petitioners for CBM review have previously
been defendants in federal court litigation where the same patent was
asserted. Two related measures support this finding. One is the share of
CBM petitioners (77.9%) who have previously been defendants in district
court litigations involving the patents they later challenge in CBM review.
The other is the share of CBM petitions (82.7%) in which at least one
petitioner was previously a defendant as to the patent now being
challenged. These results are perhaps unsurprising, as CBM petitions can
only be brought by those sued for, or charged with, infringement.
Additionally, though it is not particularly meaningful to speak of
technology differences among CBM petitions, 129 Figures 14a and 14b
show that the finding also persists for each NBER technology category.
Similarly, in the case of IPRs, the majority (70%) of IPR petitioners
have previously been defendants in district court litigations involving the
patents they now challenge. The remaining 30% of cases in which
petitioners are not prior defendants do, however, represent an interesting
128. This difference was highly statistically significant (p <0.0001 using a two-tailed
test of proportions).
129. This is because the availability of CBM review is defined, and limited, by
technology, and as a result, CCM patents have accounted for 82.2% of all CBM
Petitions, with 15.9% coming from Mechanical patents and 1.9% from Other patents. See
infra Figure 6.
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puzzle, particularly if one looks across technologies, and also at the
percentage of petitions in which at least one petitioner was previously a
defendant. We turn next to this puzzle.
d) IPR Challenges by Entities That Were Not Prior Defendants
As Figure 15a shows, the percentage of IPR petitioners who were not
prior defendants varies substantially across technologies. Notably, because
only about 48% of petitioners in the Drugs and Medical area have
previously been sued, over half of all petitioners in this technology are
non-standard. In some cases, generic firms may be filing even prior to
being sued in order to clear the path toward eventual entry into the
market. In other cases, we know from reading IPR petitions to identify
petitioners that third parties have been active. One active third party is J.
Kyle Bass, the principal of Hayman Capital Management and of the
Coalition for Affordable Drugs, who has filed at least twenty-eight
petitions.130 Another is Erich Spangenberg, the chief executive of the IP
Navigation Group and of nXn Partners, who has also filed at least twenty-
eight petitions.'"' Both Mr. Bass and Mr. Spangenberg have thus far focused
their validity challenges entirely on Drugs and Medical-related patents.
Figures 15a and 15b also reveal substantial disparities in certain
technology areas between the share of petitioners who were previously sued
and the share of IPR petitions with at least one petitioner who was
previously a defendant on the challenged patent. Specifically, the
petitioner vs. petition disparities are quite substantial in the categories of
Drugs and Medical (48.5% vs. 70.8%), Mechanical (53.1% vs. 70.2%), and
Other (65.5% vs. 82.6%). The disparities reveal that, in each of these
technology areas, petitioners who are not prior defendants are joining
petitions filed by prior defendants.
Arguably, this collective action is socially beneficial, as it directly
addresses the general collective action problem in challenging invalid
patents.132 However, to the extent collective action takes the form of serial
petitions that are joined later to the petition of a prior defendant, it could
be seen as harassment and delay. Currently, our data do not allow us to
130. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent,
Short the Stock, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund
-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 [http://perma.cc/
X26M-53QM].
131. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert
-to-corporate-america.html [http://perma.cc/R2X6-8D491.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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determine exactly when nondefendant petitioners are joining the petitions
of defendants. PTO regulations do require, however, that a joinder request
be filed no later than one month after the institution date of any inter
partes review for which joinder is requested. 3' In ongoing research, we are
parsing the joinder data more finely to look at timing and how the
regulations are being applied.
In this regard, it bears mention that fostering collective action is the
explicit mission of organizations such as Unified Patents, which files
patent validity challenges on behalf of its member companies in order to
reduce their patent litigation risk.13 4 We expect that, in order to be
effective, such member-based organizations would likely file significant
numbers of IPR petitions and focus their efforts largely on a single
technology area. Unified Patents, for example, has filed at least twenty-
four petitions of which seventeen (71%) are against CCM-related patents.
e) Timing Between the Courts and the USPTO
Closely related to the "non-standard" petitioner issue is the question of
time lag between Article III assertion and PTAB challenge. Unless the
petition includes a request for joinder, a petitioner cannot file an IPR
challenge more than a year after it has been sued for infringing a particular
patent. 3 s As a result, administrative validity challenges filed more than
one year after the last federal court lawsuit prior to a petition are likely to
reflect either non-standard petitioners and/or petitioners seeking joinder
to earlier petitions.
To investigate these issues further, we measured the time lag between
the first IPR petition on a given patent and the federal court litigation on
that patent filed most recently prior to the first IPR petition. (By definition,
the first IPR petition cannot request joinder.) As an additional frame of
reference for these results, we calculated the lag between the first IPR
petition on a given patent and the earliest observed federal court litigation
on that patent. The latter measure takes a broad view of how court-agency
lags are distributed and is likely to contain a small, but non-trivial number
of instances where the lag is greater than one year. The reason is that, for
repeatedly-asserted patents, the first defendant sued need not be the one
that mounts a validity challenge in the USPTO.
133. 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).
134. UNIFIED PATENTS INC., http://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq [http://perma.cc/
K4XC-4Y23].
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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As Figure 17 shows, quite a few patents fit this latter profile: nearly a
quarter of the distribution (23.4%) exceeds the one-year lag from the
earliest observed federal court litigation on a given patent, reaching
upwards of three years for some patents. Notably, a small share of patents,
roughly 3.3%, shows a negative lag indicating the first IPR petition against
the patent preceded the first federal court assertion of the patent.136 For
these patents, administrative validity challenges are not defensive in the
traditional sense, as no offensive litigation has yet been observed; rather,
they are, at most, preemptive. Most IPR petitions, however, fall within the
zero-to-one-year range, distributed symmetrically about a median lag of
six months, with a modal spike at the one-year deadline.
Meanwhile, measuring from the last pre-IPR federal court lawsuit to
the first IPR petition is likely to capture not only non-standard petitioners
but also cases where earlier lawsuits against others have revealed useful
information about the patent owner's enforcement strategy so that less
time is needed to decide whether and how to prepare an IPR challenge.
This is, in fact, what the data reveal in Figure 18. The majority of cases
fall again within the zero-to-one-year range, but with a median lag
roughly four months less than in Figure 17. A far smaller share of the
distribution (11.4%) exceeds one year-presumably this 11.4% comprises
of non-standard petitioners only. As before, a modal spike near and at a
one-year lag indicates that litigants wait for the statutory deadline.
These direct and indirect measures suggest that challenges to patent
validity through inter partes review are primarily-though not exclusively-a
defensive response to existing litigation. In most cases, a prior defendant
files an administrative challenge. Other entities, acting on this revealed
information, may also respond with petitions for validity review.
We now turn to another aspect of strategic behavior in patent
litigation that has previously presented policy concerns: the tendency of
patent cases to be filed disproportionately in a few judicial districts, so
much so that these districts are now widely identified with patent
litigation.
f) District-Specific Effects
Skewed distribution of patent litigation toward particular high-volume
judicial districts and litigant forum-shopping, which not only results from
this skew but also contributes to it, are well documented.' It is likely,
136. As we have discussed, these preemptively-challenged patents may reflect
litigation in the offing or else no related litigation. See supra Sections III.A.2.a-b.
137. See generally notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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then, that such leading patent courts should send commensurately greater
numbers of patents into PTAB validity challenges as well. Yet in this
regard, the data show a surprising effect. Of the eight leading district
courts-which together account for nearly 70% of litigated patents during
the observed time period-the top three courts were overrepresented in
sending patents into PTAB validity challenges, and the remaining five
were underrepresented.
Figure 16 depicts the fraction of all litigated patents that were litigated
at least once in a given court and the fraction of all IPR-challenged patents
that were litigated at least once in the same court, across the top eight
districts for patent litigation. The latter fraction was significantly higher
than the former for the District of Delaware (41.1% vs. 34.4%), the
Eastern District of Texas (41.4% vs. 28.5%), and the Northern District of
California (21.6% vs. 15.2%),38 indicating that patents litigated in those
districts were unusually likely to be challenged in inter partes review. The
effect was reversed for the other high-volume patent districts, including
the Central District of California (14.1% vs. 16.0%), the District of New
Jersey (10.0% vs. 13.0%), and the Northern District of Illinois (4.8% vs.
9.6%).139
The great disparity we see in the Eastern District of Texas is
unsurprising-the court's strong pro-patentee reputationl40 would be
expected to drive defendants to a more strategically favorable forum. This
effect is likely in spite of the apparently low likelihood of defendants either
filing or being granted stays in the Eastern District of Texas.141 In the
cases of the District of Delaware and the Northern District of California,
the reasons for disproportionately high IPR filings are less clear.
Defendants in those districts may be encouraged, however, by the high
rate of stay grants in these districts. 42
138. These differences were highly significant (p<0.0001 using a two-tailed test of
proportions).
139. These differences were all significant as well (p<0.05 using a two-tailed test of
proportions).
140. See, e.g., Vishnubhakat, supra note 30, at 65 (discussing the reputation of the
Eastern District of Texas for producing pro-patentee outcomes).
141. PTAB Stay Stats: 2012 to May 31, 2015, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP,
http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/winston-publishes-stats-on-ptab-stays.html
[https://perma.cc/3W7H-Y3Q4].
142. Id.
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B. AGENCY DECISIONS
When petitioned, the PTAB must decide whether to institute an IPR
or CBM review on the grounds petitioned. If it decides to institute a
review, the PTAB must then adjudicate the case on its merits. Decisions
on institution and on the merits are interdependent in that the legal
standard for instituting an IPR is whether the petitioner is reasonably
likely to succeed as to at least one claim, and the legal standard for
instituting a CBM review is whether the petitioner is more likely than not
to prevail as to at least one claim. 143 Therefore, the rates of institution are
particularly important because the very fact of institution is, by statutory
design, a credible signal about the ultimate outcome of the validity
challenge.
In the case of IPR, an early study on whether the USPTO had decided
to institute or not (823 IPR petitions at the time) found that 84.0% were
granted as to at least one challenged claim.'" Further-updated data
confirm this point estimate but reveal a slow and consistent decline in the
institution rate. Figure 19 compares over time (1) the running total
number of IPR petition filings, (2) the running total number of institution
decisions, and (3) the running total number of institution decisions
granting at least one challenged claim. Calculating the institution rate as
(2) divided by (3) over time, Figure 20 shows that the rate has been
declining and is currently 74.8%.
The earlier study also found that 74.0% of at-least-partially instituted
petitions were fully instituted. Our data conflict on this point. We find
that 51.4% of at-least-partially instituted petitions were fully instituted1 45
and, more relevantly, that 38.4% of petitions that received an institution
decision were fully instituted. These trends are summarized in Figure 21.
In addition to general institution rates, we also disaggregate institution
rates by technology area and by the grounds on which patent validity was
143. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(b), supra note 91; LEXMACHINA, supra note 110, and
accompanying text. A CBM review may also be instituted for policy reasons. See sources
cited supra note 111 and accompanying text.
144. Love &Ambwani, supra note 2, at 100.
145. In order to compare rates of partial and fill institution, we keep consistent the
denominator of petitions that have received an institution decision whereas the Love-
Ambwani study reports full institution as a fraction of partial institution. By that
measure, too, our findings differ: we find that 41.2% of at-least-partially instituted
petitions were fully instituted, not 74.0%. This discrepancy controls for the amount of
data available at the time of the earlier study-roughly the end of March 2014, when 843
institution decisions had been made and 699 petitions had been at-least-partially
instituted.
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challenged. Figure 22 shows the rates at which institutions are granted and
denied across technologies for petitions arguing a lack of novelty. Petitions
on Drugs and Medical-related patents have a 59.9% likelihood of being
denied,146 and in all other technologies, petitions are as likely as not to be
instituted (p >0.05). Figure 23 shows the rates at which institutions are
granted and denied across technologies for petitions arguing a lack of
nonobviousness. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the ability of expert
judges to combine multiple references, nonobviousness petitions are more
likely than not to be instituted across all technology areas. Nonobviousness
challenges to Chemical patents are particularly likely to be granted, with
an institution rate of 68.5%.147
Meanwhile, for CBM petitions, comparing technology categories is
not particularly meaningful, as the definition of covered business method
patents in practice overlaps substantially with CCM-related patents.
Instead, because CBM review allows the full range of legal grounds on
which to challenge validity 48 and because petitioners themselves have
availed themselves of these grounds to varying degrees,14 9 comparing the
rates at which CBM petitions have been instituted with respect to each of
these grounds is more meaningful.
Figure 7 previously showed that subject-matter eligibility under § 101,
novelty under § 102, and nonobviousness under § 103 were the major
grounds on which CBM petitions have been filed whereas the
enablement, written description, and definiteness requirements of § 112
have been employed relatively infrequently. Because CBM review arose
out of categorical resistance to business methods as patent-eligible subject
matter, and inception of CBM review coincided with Supreme Court
decisions substantially strengthening patent eligibility requirements, we
expected that subject-matter challenges would be the most fertile ground
for decisions to institute CBM petitions. We expected that the remaining
grounds would be likely to garner fewer PTAB institutions, though in the
particular case of nonobviousness, the higher standard imposed by the
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in KSR Int'1 Co. v. Teleflex Inc.150 might
have an impact.
146. The differences between respective likelihoods of grant and denial are highly
significant (p <0.001 using a two-tailed test of proportions).
147. The differences between respective likelihoods of grant and denial are significant
(p <0.05) for Mechanical-related petitions, and highly significant for all other
technologies (p<0.005). Comparisons use a two-tailed test of proportions.
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2); Frontz, supra note 102; supra note 107.
149. See infra Figure 7.
150. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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Figure 24 confirms our hypothesis that subject matter eligibility would
dominate the CBM procedure. Subject matter eligibility-based CBM
petitions are overwhelmingly instituted, at a rate of 70.9%.s' For all other
grounds, decisions not to institute predominate by large margins:
challenges based on novelty were denied at a rate of 59.3%;
nonobviousness, 56.9%; enablement, 100%; written description, 71.7%;
and definiteness, 64.7%.152
C. COURT DECISIONS
While the USPTO evaluates and decides invalidity petitions, federal
courts must decide how to manage ongoing patent infringement litigation
on which these validity challenges can have considerable impact. The most
frequent decision for courts is when to issue a stay. The ability of
defendants to obtain litigation stays pending the outcome of validity
challenges is a powerful strategic consideration in managing both the
immediate cost of litigation and the eventual threat of liability.
Conversely, the tendency of courts to grant such stays is a powerful
strategic consideration for patent owners to enforce their rights effectively
and deflect potential harassment and abuse by challengers.
Table 1. Results of Motions to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review
Pending Inter Partes 2021
Review
Stipulated/Agreed
Motion to Stay Pending 0 2 2 1
Inter Partes Review
Sua Sponte Motion to
Stay Pending Inter Partes 0 0 0 1
Review
Subtotal 69 49 26 126
Share 25.6% 18.2% 9.63% 46.7%
151. The difference between likelihoods of grant and denial is highly significant
(p<0.0001 using a two-tailed test of proportions).
152. The differences between likelihoods of grant and denial were all significant
(p<0.05) and in many cases highly significant (p<0.005) using a two-tailed test of
proportions.
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Table 2. Results of Motions to Stay Pending Covered Business Method Review
Motion to Stay Pending 12 7 9 26
CBM Review
Renewed Motion to Stay 1 0 0 7
Pending CBM Review
Sua Sponte Motion to
Stay Pending CBM 0 0 0 1
Review
Subtotal 13 7 9 34
Share 20.6% 11.1% 14.3% 54.0%
Tables 1 and 2 provide basic statistics regarding motions for stays
pending IPR and CBM proceedings, as well as federal court adjudications
of such motions. As the statistics indicate, fill denials of motions to stay
(as contrasted to the combined total of "denials without prejudice," partial
grants, and grants) are relatively rare, particularly in the context of CBM
reviews.
III. DISCUSSION
Our analysis yields several "top-line" findings regarding strategic
choices by parties in PTAB proceedings. Most patents challenged at the
PTAB are also in Article III litigation-PTAB petitions on patents that
are not being litigated in an Article III court are relatively rare. Moreover,
if there is no Article III litigation, CCM patents are particularly unlikely
to be challenged at the PTAB. In this area of technology, district court
assertion may be necessary to force parties to overcome several technology-
specific barriers to a petition. These barriers may include an absence of
clarity regarding the merits of a validity challenge created by lack of
boundary notice, as well as informational hurdles created by the sheer
volume of CCM patents.
Just as Article III litigation disproportionately accompanies PTAB
petitions on CCM patents, IPR petitions in the CCM field appear to be
brought largely by the same entities that are defendants in Article III
litigation. Both the share of CCM petitions involving at least one prior
Article III defendant (81.5%) and the share of CCM petitioners who are
themselves prior defendants (76.3%) are quite high. This result suggests
that non-standard petitioners are, at least thus far, playing a relatively
modest role in IPR petitions brought against CCM patents. Thus, to the
812016]
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extent we see a substantial amount of serial petitioning in the CCM area,
this is being generated by prior defendants.
The most significant role for non-standard petitioners is in the Drugs
and Medical area. For Drugs and Medical-related challenges, previously
sued defendants make up only a minority of petitioners (48.5%). Non-
standard petitioners also appear to be engaging in significant collective
action with standard petitioners. A substantial majority (70.8%) of
petitions in this area contains at least one petitioner who has previously
been sued. Litigation defendants in the Drugs and Medical field are
clearly bringing aboard entities that have not yet been sued. In order to
address policy implications (e.g., whether it is socially beneficial collective
action or possible harassment), we are currently investigating the
important policy question of precisely when these other entities are getting
on board.
In addition to technology-specific effects, we see district-specific
effects. To a statistically significant degree, patents litigated in the "top
three" district courts-the Eastern District of Texas, the District of
Delaware, and the Northern District of California-are more likely to be
the subject of an IPR than patents litigated in other districts. The
statistically and numerically significant results for the Eastern District of
Texas are unsurprising. Whether or not judges in the Eastern District
grant stays for ongoing litigation (and the available data suggest
defendants are less likely to seek or be granted stays than in other
districts), the Eastern District's "pro-plaintiff' reputation makes filing a
PTAB petition an obvious choice for any defendant. In the case of
Delaware and the Northern District of California, the reasons for
disproportionately high IPR filings are less clear. Defendants in those
districts may be encouraged, however, by the high rate of stay grants in
these districts.
Agency decision-making also exhibits some interesting patterns.
Perhaps because high early rates of institution spurred petitioners to
challenge somewhat stronger patents, the overall institution rate has
decreased over time. Agency decision-making also exhibits differential
patterns across technology: specifically, IPR institution rates are
significantly higher for CCM patents than for Drug and Medical patents.
Meanwhile, nonobviousness represents a stronger ground for securing a
favorable institution decision on an IPR than novelty. As for CBM
reviews, § 101 is clearly the best route for challengers.
In current ongoing work, we are investigating both more intensively
and more formally the interrelated questions of collective action and
potential harassment. Specifically, we are investigating the precise nature
82
STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
and timing of the collective action undertaken both by petitioners that are
prior defendants and those that are not prior defendants. We are also
interested in whether non-defendant petitioners do in fact become
defendants at a later point in time. Additionally, we are developing
regression models that assess, conditional on assertion in litigation, what
factors influence the likelihood and frequency of a patent being challenged
at the PTAB.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our data indicate that the standard model of prior district court
defendants bringing PTAB petitions on the patents for which they have
been sued explains the majority of PTAB cases. PTAB-only cases are
relatively rare, and particularly rare in the case of Computers and
Communication (CCM) patents.
That said, a significant minority of IPRs are being brought by entities
that are not prior defendants in lawsuits over the patents that they are now
challenging. In ongoing research, we are examining the precise role of
these non-standard petitioners to examine whether they are engaging in
beneficial collective action or in non-beneficial harassment.
Finally, at least thus far, the relative reluctance of the Eastern District
of Texas to grant stays does not appear to have impeded entities'
disproportionate desire to seek IPRs for patents asserted in the Eastern
District. Perhaps more surprisingly, patents asserted in the Northern
District of California and in the District of Delaware also see a
disproportionate number of IPR petitions.
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APPENDIX A: DATA
Our analysis can be replicated using data from DocketNavigator,
which provides free and low-cost access to coded metadata about patent
cases in the U.S. federal courts and the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal
Board."s' In this Appendix, we describe the DocketNavigator data with
the understanding that other researchers can readily access it to replicate
our study.
A. PTAB DATA
DocketNavigator's search interface allows minimal queries that can
yield large result sets. Thus, to obtain all case information on all petitions
filed in the PTAB, we used only one search term: "Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (PTAB)" for the "Court/Agency" field. Because the total
number of PTAB cases in the DocketNavigator database recently passed
4,000 and search results are displayed one hundred at a time, the results
are distributed across forty pages. Detailed party information about cases is
bulk-downloadable on a page-by-page basis, i.e., each download contains
detailed party information about the cases displayed on the given page of
results. Similarly, detailed information about the patents involved in the
cases is bulk-downloadable on a page-by-page basis as well. Both sets of
case information include multiple variables:
Party Information Patent Information
Case name Case name
Court abbreviation Court abbreviation
Case number Case number
Case filing date Case filing date
Party name Patent
Party roles Patent title
Firm name Parties
Attorney name USPTO class codes
Cooperative patent class codes
Importantly, case-identifying variables appear in both sets of
downloads, allowing them to be merged. To construct our data set, we
downloaded this detailed party information as well as patent information
for all PTAB petitions and merged them by PTAB case number. The
153. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://www.docketnavigator.com [http://perma.cc/QLY4
-LJT7].
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merged results yielded a comprehensive set of filing, party, and patent
information for each IPR and CBM review petition at the PTAB.
In addition to petition data, DocketNavigator provides searchable data
on PTAB institution decisions. As the earliest PTAB institution decisions
came in December 2012, a date-based search for decisions issued on or
after November 1, 2012 (or any similarly early date), returns a set of all
decisions. As with petition data, these results are accessible one hundred at
a time on a page-by-page basis. To this end, the "Print Friendly" feature
in the search result interface generates a simple formatted table to copy
directly into spreadsheet software. The institution decision data contain
the following variables:
Institution Decision Information
Patent number
Case name
Case number
Substantive ground for petition
Institution decision on that ground
Relevant patent claims to which the decision pertains
Order filing date
Finally, DocketNavigator provides searchable data on final
determinations by the PTAB. Searching for "Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB)" in the "Court/Agency" field returns a set of all
determinations. These results, too, are accessible one hundred at a time on
a page-by-page basis and available in a simple formatted table through the
"Print Friendly" feature in the search result interface. The final
determinations data contain the following variables:
Final Determination Information
Patent number
Case name
Case filing date
Determination
Judge
Order filing date
Because this institution decision data and final determination data also
contain case-identifying variables that overlap with the filing, party, and
patent data, we readily merged this additional information into our data
set as well.
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B. DISTRICT COURT DATA
We obtained case information on patent litigations filed in the U.S.
district courts with a similarly minimal search query in DocketNavigator's
primary search interface: "U.S. District Courts (and all districts)" for the
"Court/Agency" field. The total number of patent cases in the
DocketNavigator database exceeded 55,000 results. Because IPR petitions
are generally time-barred one year from the date when a would-be
petitioner has been sued on the same patent in U.S. district court,154 we
determined that a reasonably complete set of federal patent litigation
would not need to extend more than one year before the IPR mechanism
became available. Therefore, we narrowed our search to cases, other than
declaratory judgment cases, filed on or after September 16, 2011, one year
prior to the enactment of IPR and CBM review mechanisms in the PTAB.
As with PTAB cases, detailed party and patent information about U.S.
district court patent cases is bulk-downloadable on a page-by-page basis.
Both sets of case information include multiple variables:
Party Information Patent Information
Case name Case name
Court abbreviation Court abbreviation
Case number Case number
Case filing date Case filing date
Party name Patent
Party roles Patent title
Firm name Parties
Attorney name USPTO class codes
Cooperative patent class codes
To construct our data set, we downloaded this detailed party and
patent information for all relevant patent lawsuits and merged them on the
case number, producing a comprehensive set of filing, party, and patent
information on each patent lawsuit in the U.S. district courts.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES
Figure 1: IPR Petition Filings by Month
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Figure 3: Cumulative IPR Petition Filings Across Technology
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Figure 4: Proportions of IPR Petitions Containing Each Grounds
for Challenge, Across Technology Area
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Figure 5: CBM Petition Filings by Month
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Figure 6: CBM Petition Filings Across Technology
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Figure 7: Proportions of CBM Petitions Containing Each Grounds for Challenge
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Figure 8: Share of IPR-Challenged Patents in Each Technology Area
That Were the Subject of Multiple Petitions
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Figure 11: Cumulative Patent Case Filings Across Technology
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Figure 12: Average Number of Federal-Court Assertion of
Patents Challenged in IPR or CBM Petitions
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Figure 14a: Share of CBM Petitioners That Were Defendants in a
Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Figure 14b: Share of CBM Petitions in Which At Least One Petitioner Was a
Defendant in a Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Figure 15a: Share of IPR Petitioners That Were Defendants in a
Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Figure 24: CBM Institutions of Petitions, by Grounds
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APPENDIX C: TABLES
Table 1: Inter Partes petitions filed by Intel in the Zond cases
Petition For
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
Intel Corporation
113
IPR Number
IPR2014-00443
IPR2014-00444
IPR2014-00445
1PR2014-00446
IPR2014-00447
IPR2014-00455
IPR2014-00456
IPR2014-00468
1PR2014-00470
IPR2014-00473
IPR2014-00494
IPR2014-00495
IPR2014-00496
IPR2014-00497
IPR2014-00498
IPR2014-00520
IPR2014-00521
IPR2014-00522
1PR2014-00523
IPR2014-00598
IPR2014-00686
IPR2014-00765
IPR2014-00820
IPR2014-00843
IPR2014-00913
1PR2014-00923
IPR2014-00945
F D ate
Feb.20,2014
Feb.20,2014
Feb.20,2014
Feb.20,2014
Feb.20,2014
Feb.27,2014
Feb.27,2014
Feb.28,2014
Mar. 7,2014
Mar. 7,2014
Mar. 13, 2014
Mar. 13,2014
Mar. 13, 2014
Mar. 13, 2014
Mar. 13, 2014
Mar. 27,2014
Mar. 27, 2014
Mar. 27,2014
Mar. 27,2014
Apr. 9, 2014
Apr. 24, 2014
May 16, 2014
May27, 2014
May29, 2014
Jun 6, 2014
Jun 10, 2014
Jun 12, 2014
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Table 2: Inter Partes Review Petitions filed by Defendants in Zond cases
Petition For
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.
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IPR Number
IPR2014-01037
IPR2014-01075
IPR2014-01071
IPR2014-01069
IPR2014-00848
IPR2014-00850
IPR2014-00844
IPR2014-00846
IPR2014-00845
IPR2014-00849
1PR2014-00855
IPR2014-00866
IPR2014-00851
IPR2014-00865
IPR2014-00856
IPR2014-00859
1PR2014-00858
IPR2014-00863
IPR2014-00864
IPR2014-00867
IPR2014-00918
IPR2014-01042
IPR2014-01059
IPR2014-01047
IPR2014-01083
1PR2014-01086
IPR2014-01076
IPR2014-01061
IPR2014-01087
IPR2014-01073
IPR2014-01088
IPR2014-01098
IPR2014-01099
IPR2014-01089
IPR2014-01100
Filing Date
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
May 29, 2014
May 29, 2014
May29, 2014
May29,2014
May 29, 2014
May 29, 2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
May30,2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
May 30, 2014
June 09, 2014
June 27, 2014
June 27, 2014
June 27, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
July 01, 2014
July 01, 2014
July 01, 2014
July01, 2014
July 01, 2014
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Renesas Electronics Corp.
Renesas Electronics Corp.
Renesas Electronics Corp.
Renesas Electronics Corp.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
IPR2014-01057
IPR2014-01046
IPR2014-01066
IPR2014-01063
IPR2014-00805
1PR2014-00782
IPR2014-00781
IPR2014-00800
IPR2014-00799
IPR2014-00803
1PR2014-00802
IPR2014-00807
IPR2014-00808
IPR2014-00819
IPR2014-00821
IPR2014-00818
IPR2014-00828
IPR2014-00829
IPR2014-00827
IPR2014-00861
IPR2014-00917
IPR2014-00479
IPR2014-00477
IPR2014-00974
IPR2014-00975
IPR2014-00972
IPR2014-00973
IPR2014-00992
DPR2014-00986
IPR2014-00981
IPR2014-00991
IPR2014-00984
IPR2014-00990
IPR2014-00988
IPR2014-00985
IPR2014-01003
Filing Date
June 27, 2014
June 27, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 30, 2014
May 23, 2014
May 19, 2014
May 19, 2014
May 22, 2014
May 22, 2014
May 22, 2014
May 22, 2014
May23, 2014
May 23, 2014
May 27, 2014
May27, 2014
May27, 2014
May 28, 2014
May 28, 2014
May 28, 2014
May 30, 2014
June 09, 2014
Mar. 4,2014
Mar. 4,2014
June 18, 2014
June 18, 2014
June 18, 2014
June 18, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 19, 2014
June 20, 2014
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The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
The Gillette Co.
Toshiba Corp.
Toshiba Corp.
Toshiba Corp.
Toshiba Corp.
Toshiba Corp.
IPR Number
IPR2014-00996
IPR2014-01000
IPR2014-00995
IPR2014-01004
IPR2014-01012
IPR2014-01017
IPR2014-01016
IPR2014-01015
IPR2014-01019
IPR2014-01014
IPR2014-01013
IPR2014-01020
IPR2014-01022
IPR2014-01025
IPR2014-01072
IPR2014-01070
IPR2014-01067
IPR2014-01074
IPR2014-01065
Table 3: Inter Partes Review Petitions filed by Defedants in E-Watch v. LG Electronics
Petition For IPR Number Filing Date
HTC Corp.
Sony Mobile Comm. (USA) Inc.
LG Electronics, Inc.
Kyocera Communications, Inc.
Apple Inc.
Apple Inc.
Apple Inc.
Samsung Electronics Co.
Samsung Electronics Co.
Samsung Electronics Co.
ZTE (USA) Inc.
IPR2014-00987
IPR2015-00402
IPR2015-00404
IPR2015-00406
IPR2015-00411
IPR2015-00412
IPR2015-00413
IPR2015-00541
IPR2015-00610
IPR2015-00612
IPR2015-01366
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June 19, 2014
Dec. 10, 2014
Dec. 10, 2014
Dec. 10, 2014
Dec. 11, 2014
Dec. 11, 2014
Dec. 11, 2014
Jan. 7, 2015
Jan.23,2015
Jan. 23, 2015
June 09, 2015
Filing Date
June 20, 2014
June 20, 2014
June 20, 2014
June 20, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 30, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
June 23, 2014
